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Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that the outcome
should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be manipulable. In this paper,
we provide a computer-aided proof of a sweeping impossibility using these two conditions for randomized
aggregation mechanisms. More precisely, we show that every efficient aggregation mechanism can be ma-
nipulated for all expected utility representations of the agents’ preferences. This settles an open problem and
strengthens a number of existing theorems, including statements that were shown within the special domain
of assignment. Our proof is obtained by formulating the claim as a satisfiability problem over predicates from
real-valued arithmetic, which is then checked using an SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solver. In order
to verify the correctness of the result, a minimal unsatisfiable set of constraints returned by the SMT solver
was translated back into a proof in higher-order logic, which was automatically verified by an interactive
theorem prover. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of SMT solvers in computational
social choice.
1 INTRODUCTION
Models and results from microeconomic theory, in particular from game theory and social choice,
have proven to be very valuable when reasoning about computational multiagent systems [see,
e.g., Brandt et al. 2016a; Nisan et al. 2007; Rothe 2015; Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009]. Two fun-
damental notions in this context are efficiency—no agent can be made better off without making
another one worse off—and strategyproofness—no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome
by manipulating his preferences. Gibbard [1973] and Satterthwaite [1975] have shown that every
strategyproof social choice function is either dictatorial or imposing. Hence, strategyproofness can
only be achieved at the cost of discriminating among the agents or among the alternatives. One
natural possibility to restore fairness is to allow for randomization. Functions that map a profile of
individual preferences to a probability distribution over alternatives (a so-called lottery) are known
as social decision schemes (SDSs). The use of lotteries for the selection of officials interestingly goes
back to the world’s first democracy in Athens, where it was widely regarded as a principal char-
acteristic of democracy [Headlam 1933], and has recently gained increasing attention in political
science [see, e.g., Dowlen 2009; Guerrero 2014] and social choice [see, e.g., Brandt 2017].
Generalizing his previous result, Gibbard [1977] proved that the only strategyproof and ex post
efficient social decision schemes are randomizations over dictatorships.1 Gibbard’s notion of strat-
egyproofness requires that no agent is better off bymanipulating his preferences for some expected
utility representation of the agents’ ordinal preferences. This condition is quite demanding because
an SDS may be deemed manipulable just because it can be manipulated for a contrived and highly
unlikely utility representation. In this paper, we adopt a weaker notion of strategyproofness, first
used by Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986] and popularized by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001].
This notion requires that no agent should be better off by manipulating his preferences for all
1Alternative proofs for this important theorem were provided by Duggan [1996], Nandeibam [1997], and Tanaka
[2003].
2 Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, and Christian Geist
expected utility representations of the agents’ preferences. At the same time, we use a stronger
notion of efficiency than Gibbard [1977]. This notion is defined in analogy to our notion of strate-
gyproofness and requires that no agent can be made better off for all utility representations of the
agents’ preferences, without making another one worse off for some utility representation. This
type of efficiency was introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001] and is also known as ordinal
efficiency or SD-efficiency where SD stands for stochastic dominance.
Our main result establishes that no anonymous and neutral SDS satisfies efficiency and
strategyproofness. This settles a conjecture by Aziz et al. [2013b] and strengthens theorems by
Aziz et al. [2013b], Aziz et al. [2014], and Brandl et al. [2016b]. It also generalizes related state-
ments that were shown within the special domain of assignment, when interpreting them as so-
cial choice results [Aziz and Kasajima 2017; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; Katta and Sethuraman
2006; Kojima 2009; Nesterov 2017; Zhou 1990].
The proof of our main result heavily relies on computer-aided solving techniques. These tech-
niques were introduced in computational social choice by Tang and Lin [2009], who reduce well-
known impossibility results, such as Arrow’s theorem, to finite instances, which can then be
checked by a Boolean satisfiability (SAT) solver. More recently, this idea has been adapted to
more complex settings and axioms while focussing on proving new results rather than reproduc-
ing existing ones [Brandl et al. 2015; Brandt and Geist 2016; Brandt et al. 2016b; Geist and Endriss
2011]. An overview of computer-aided theorem proving in computational social choice is given by
Geist and Peters [2017].
In this paper, we go beyond the SAT-based techniques of previous contributions by designing an
SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) encoding that captures axioms for randomized social choice.
SMT can be viewed as an enriched form of the satisfiability problem (SAT)where Boolean variables
are replaced by statements from a theory, such as specific data types or arithmetics. Similar to SAT,
there is a range of SMT solvers developed by an active community that runs annual competitions
[Barrett et al. 2013]. Typically, SMT solvers are used as backends for verification tasks such as
the verification of software. To capture axioms about lotteries, we use the theory of (quantifier-
free) linear real arithmetic. Solving this version of SMT can be seen as an extension to linear
programming in which arbitrary Boolean operators are allowed to connect (in-)equalities.
Following the idea of Brandt and Geist [2016], we extracted aminimal unsatisfiable set (MUS) of
constraints in order to verify our result. Despite its relatively complex 94 (non-trivial) constraints,
which operate on 47 canonical preference profiles, the MUS was translated back into a proof in
higher-order logic, which in turn was verified via the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
This releases any need to verify our program for generating the SMT formula. We also translated
this proof into a human-readable—but tedious to check—proof, which is given in the Appendix.
2 THE MODEL
LetA be a finite set ofm alternatives andN = {1, . . . ,n} a set of agents. A (weak) preference relation
is a complete and transitive binary relation on A. The preference relation reported by agent i
is denoted by %i , and the set of all preference relations by R. In accordance with conventional
notation, we write ≻i for the strict part of %i , i.e., x ≻i y if x %i y but not y %i x , and ∼i for the
indifference part of %i , i.e., x ∼i y if x %i y and y %i x . A preference relation %i is linear if x ≻i y
or y ≻i x for all distinct alternatives x ,y ∈ A. We will compactly represent a preference relation as
a comma-separated list where all alternatives among which an agent is indifferent are placed in a
set. For example, x ≻i y ∼i z is represented by %i : x , {y, z}. A preference profile R = (%1, . . . ,%n)
is an n-tuple containing a preference relation %i for each agent i ∈ N . The set of all preference
profiles is thus given by RN . For a given R ∈ RN and % ∈ R, Ri 7→% denotes a preference profile
identical to R except that %i is replaced with %, i.e., Ri 7→% = R \ {(i,%i )} ∪ {(i,%)}.
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2.1 Social Decision Schemes
Our central objects of study are social decision schemes: functions that map a preference profile to
a lottery (or probability distribution) over the alternatives. The set of all lotteries over A is denoted
by ∆(A), i.e., ∆(A) = {p ∈ RA≥0 :
∑
x ∈A p(x) = 1}, where p(x) is the probability that p assigns to x .
Formally, a social decision scheme (SDS) is a function f : RN → ∆(A). By supp(p) we denote the
support of a lottery p ∈ ∆(A), i.e., the set of all alternatives to which p assigns positive probability.
Two common minimal fairness conditions for SDSs are anonymity and neutrality, i.e., symmetry
with respect to agents and alternatives, respectively. Formally, anonymity requires that f (R) =
f (R ◦ σ ) for all R ∈ RN and permutations σ : N → N over agents. Neutrality, on the other hand,
is defined via permutations over alternatives. An SDS f is neutral if f (R)(x) = f (π (R))(π (x)) for
all R ∈ RN , permutations π : A→ A, and x ∈ A.2
2.2 Efficiency and Strategyproofness
Many important properties of SDSs, such as efficiency and strategyproofness, require us to reason
about the preferences that agents have over lotteries. This is commonly achieved by assuming that
in a preference profile R every agent i , in addition to this preference relation %i , is equipped with
a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function uRi : A → R. By definition, a utility function
uRi has to be consistent with the ordinal preferences, i.e., for all x ,y ∈ A, u
R
i (x) ≥ u
R
i (y) iff x %i y.
A utility representation u then associates with each preference profile R an n-tuple (uR1 , . . . ,u
R
n ) of
such utility functions. Whenever the preference profile R is clear from the context, the superscript
will be omitted and we write ui instead of the more cumbersome uRi .
Given a utility function ui , agent i prefers lottery p to lottery q iff the expected utility for p is
at least as high as that of q. With slight abuse of notation the domain of utility functions can be
extended to ∆(A) by taking expectations, i.e.,
ui (p) =
∑
x ∈A
p(x)ui (x).
It is straightforward to define efficiency and strategyproofness using expected utility. For a given
utility representation u and a preference profile R, a lottery p u-(Pareto-)dominates another lottery
q at R if
uRi (p) ≥ u
R
i (q) for all i ∈ N , and
uRi (p) > u
R
i (q) for some i ∈ N .
An SDS f is u-efficient if it never returns u-dominated lotteries, i.e., for all R ∈ RN , f (R) is not
u-dominated at R. The notion of u-strategyproofness can be defined analogously: for a given util-
ity representation u, preference profile R, agent i , and preference relation %, an SDS f can be
u-manipulated at R by agent i reporting % if
uRi (f (R
i 7→%)) > uRi (f (R)).
An SDS is u-strategyproof if there is no preference profile R, agent i , and preference relation %
such that it can be u-manipulated at R by agent i reporting %.
The assumption that the vNMutility functions of all agents (and thus their complete preferences
over lotteries) are known is quite unrealistic. Often even the agents themselves are uncertain about
2π (R) is the preference profile obtained from π by replacing %i with %pii for every i ∈ N , where π (x ) %
pi
i
π (y) if and
only if x %i y .
4 Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, and Christian Geist
their preferences over lotteries and are only aware of their ordinal preferences over alternatives.3
A natural way to model this uncertainty is to leave the utility functions unspecified and instead
quantify over all utility functions that are consistent with the agents’ ordinal preferences. This
modeling assumption leads to much weaker notions of efficiency and strategyproofness.
Definition 2.1. An SDS is efficient if it never returns a lottery that is u-dominated for all utility
representations u.
As mentioned in the introduction, this notion of efficiency is also known as ordinal efficiency or
SD-efficiency [see, e.g., Aziz et al. 2015, 2016; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001]. The relationship to
stochastic dominance will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
Example 2.2. Consider A = {a,b, c,d} and the preference profile R = (%1, . . . ,%4),
%1 : {a, c}, {b,d}, %2 : {b,d}, {a, c},
%3 : {a,d},b, c , %4 : {b, c},a,d
Observe that the lottery 7/24a + 7/24b + 5/24 c + 5/24d , which is returned by the well-known SDS
random serial dictatorship (RSD), is u-dominated by 1/2a + 1/2b for every utility representation u.
Hence, any SDS that returns this lottery for the profile R would not be efficient. On the other
hand, the lottery 1/2a + 1/2b is not u-dominated, which can, for instance, be checked via linear
programming (see Lemma 4.5).
We can also define a weak notion of strategyproofness in analogy to our notion of efficiency.
Definition 2.3. An SDS is manipulable if there is a preference profile R, an agent i , and a prefer-
ence relation % such that it is u-manipulable at R by agent i reporting % for all utility representa-
tions u. An SDS is strategyproof if it is not manipulable.
Alternatively, there is a stronger version of strategyproofness first considered by Gibbard [1977],
which prescribes that an SDS should be u-strategyproof for all utility representations u.
For more information concerning the relationship between sets of possible utility functions and
preference extensions, such as stochastic dominance, the reader is referred to Aziz et al. [2015].
3 THE RESULT
Our main result shows that efficiency and strategyproofness are incompatible with basic fairness
properties. Aziz et al. [2013b] raised the question whether there exists an anonymous, efficient,
and strategyproof SDS. When additionally requiring neutrality, we can answer this question in
the negative.
Theorem 3.1. Ifm ≥ 4 and n ≥ 4, there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies efficiency
and strategyproofness.
The proof of Theorem 3.1, which heavily relies on computer-aided solving techniques, is dis-
cussed in Section 4. Let us first discuss the independence of the axioms and relate the result to ex-
isting theorems. RSD satisfies all axioms except efficiency; another SDS known asmaximal lotteries
satisfies all axioms except strategyproofness [cf. Aziz et al. 2016]. Serial dictatorship, the determin-
istic version of RSD, satisfies neutrality, efficiency, and strategyproofness but violates anonymity.
It is unknown whether Theorem 3.1 still holds when dropping the assumption of neutrality. Our
proof, however, only requires a technical weakening of neutrality (cf. Section 4.1).
3When assuming that all agents possess vNM utility functions, these utility functions could be taken as inputs for the
aggregation function. Such aggregation functions are called cardinal decision schemes [see, e.g., Dutta et al. 2007]. Concrete
vNM utility functions are often unavailable and their representation may require infinite space.
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3.1 Related Results for Social Choice
Theorem 3.1 generalizes several existing results and is closely related to a number of results in
subdomains of social choice. Aziz et al. [2013b] proved a weak version of Theorem 3.1 for the
rather restricted class of majoritarian SDSs, i.e., SDSs whose outcome may only depend on the
pairwise majority relation. This statement has later been generalized by Aziz et al. [2014] to all
SDSs whose outcome only depends on the weighted majority relation. More recently, Brandl et al.
[2016b] have shown that while random dictatorship satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness (as
well as anonymity and neutrality) on the domain of linear preferences, it cannot be extended
to the full domain of weak preferences without violating at least one of these properties. Their
theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1. Other impossibility results have been obtained
for stronger notions of efficiency and strategyproofness, which weakens the corresponding state-
ments. Aziz et al. [2014] have shown that there is no anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies
efficiency and strategyproofness with respect to the pairwise comparison lottery extension and
with respect to the upward lexicographic extension.4 Both of these notions of efficiency and strat-
egyproofness are stronger than the ones used in Theorem 3.1.
3.2 Related Results for Assignment
A subdomain of social choice that has been thoroughly studied in the literature is the assignment
(aka house allocation or two-sided matching with one-sided preferences) domain. Assignment
problems are concerned with the allocation of objects to agents based on the agents’ preferences
over objects. An assignment problem can be associated with a social choice problem by letting the
set of alternatives be the set of deterministic allocations and postulating that agents are indifferent
among all allocations in which they receive the same object [see, e.g., Aziz et al. 2013a].5 Thus,
impossibility results for the assignment setting can be interpreted as impossibility results for the
social choice setting because they even hold in a smaller domain and an SDS that satisfies efficiency
and strategyproofness in the social choice domain also satisfies these properties in any subdomain.
In the following we discuss impossibility results in the assignment domain which, if inter-
preted for the social choice domain and when assuming anonymity and neutrality, can be seen as
weaker versions of Theorem 3.1 because they are based on stronger notions of efficiency or strate-
gyproofness or require additional properties. In a very influential paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[2001] have shown that no randomized assignment mechanism satisfies both efficiency and a
strong notion of strategyproofness while treating all agents equally. The underlying notion of
strategyproofness is identical to the one used by Gibbard [1977] and prescribes that the SDS can-
not be u-manipulated for any utility representation u. The result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
even holds when preferences over objects are single-peaked [Kasajima 2013]. In a related paper,
Katta and Sethuraman [2006] proved that no assignment mechanism satisfies efficiency, strate-
gyproofness, and envy-freeness for the full domain of preferences.6 Related impossibility theorems
for varying notions of envy-freeness and for multi-unit demand with additive preferences were
shown by Nesterov [2017], Kojima [2009], and Aziz and Kasajima [2017].
4The statement for the pairwise comparison extension holds for at least three agents and three alternatives, whereas
Theorem 3.1 does not hold for less then four alternatives since RSD satisfies all properties for up to three alternatives. In
contrast to Theorem 3.1, the statement for the upward lexicographic extension does not require neutrality and also holds
for linear preferences.
5Note that this transformation turns assignment problems with linear preferences over k objects into social choice
problems with weak preferences over k! allocations.
6Envy-freeness is a fairness property that is stronger than equal treatment of equals as used by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001].
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Settling a conjecture by Gale [1987], Zhou [1990] showed that no cardinal assignment mech-
anism satisfies u-efficiency and u-strategyproofness while treating all agents equally.7 The rela-
tionship between Zhou’s result and Theorem 3.1 is not obvious because Zhou’s theorem concerns
cardinal mechanisms, i.e., functions that take utility profiles rather than preference profiles as in-
put. However, every cardinal assignment mechanism can be associated with an ordinal assignment
mechanism by selecting some consistent utility function for every preference relation and return-
ing the outcomes for the corresponding utility profiles. This transformation turns a u-efficient
and u-strategyproof cardinal mechanism into an efficient and strategyproof ordinal mechanism
as these properties are purely ordinal. Hence, Theorem 3.1 implies that there is no anonymous,
neutral, u-efficient, and u-strategyproof cardinal decision scheme.
4 PROVING THE RESULT
In this section, we first reduce the statement of Theorem 3.1 to the special case ofm = 4 and n = 4,
which we then prove via SMT solving. We present an encoding for any finite instance of Theo-
rem 3.1 as an SMT problem in the logic of (quantifier-free) linear real arithmetic (QF_LRA). For com-
patibility with different SMT solvers our encoding adheres to the SMT-LIB standard [Barrett et al.
2010]. In total, we are going to design the following four types of SMT constraints:
• lottery definitions (Lottery),
• the orbit condition8 (Orbit),
• strategyproofness (Strategyproofness), and
• efficiency (Efficiency).
Other conditions such as anonymity are taken care of by the representation of preference profiles.
We then apply an SMT solver to show that this set of constraints for the case ofm = 4 and n = 4
is unsatisfiable, i.e., no SDS f with the desired properties exists, and explain how the output of the
solver can be used to obtain a human-verifiable proof of this result.
Let us start with the reduction lemma before we turn to the concrete encoding in the following
subsections.
Lemma 4.1. If there is an anonymous and neutral SDS f that satisfies efficiency and strategyproof-
ness for |A| =m alternatives and |N | = n agents then, for allm′ ≤ m and n′ ≤ n, we can also find an
SDS f ′ defined form′ alternatives and n′ agents that satisfies the same properties.
Proof. Let f be an anonymous and neutral SDS that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness
form alternatives and n agents. We define a projection f ′ of f onto A′ ⊆ A, |A′| = m′ ≤ m and
N ′ = {1, . . . ,n′} ⊆ N ,n′ ≤ n that satisfies all required properties:
For every preference profile R′ on A′ and N ′, let f ′(R′) = f (R), where R is defined by the
following conditions:
%i ∩ (A
′ ×A′) = %′i for all i ∈ N
′, (1)
x ≻i y for all x ∈ A
′
,y ∈ A \ A′ and i ∈ N ′, (2)
y ∼i z for all y, z ∈ A \ A
′ and i ∈ N ′, and (3)
y ∼i z for all y, z ∈ A and i ∈ N \ N
′. (4)
Informally, by (1) agents in N ′ have the same preferences over alternatives from A′ in R and R′.
Moreover, by (2) they like every alternative inA′ strictly better than every alternative not inA′ and
by (3) they are indifferent between all alternatives not in A′. Finally, by (4) all agents in N \N ′ are
7The theorem by Zhou only requires that agents with the same utility function receive the same amount of expected
utility but not necessarily the same assignment. Gale’s original conjecture assumed equal treatment of equals.
8The orbit condition models a part of neutrality.
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completely indifferent. With these conditions, R is uniquely specified given R′, and only lotteries
p with supp(p) ⊆ A′ are efficient in R. Thus, f ′ is well-defined and it is left to show that f ′ inherits
the relevant properties from f . The SDS f ′ is anonymous since f is anonymous and agents in N
can only differ by their preferences over A′. Neutrality follows as f is neutral and all agents are
indifferent between all alternatives not inA′. Efficiency is satisfied by f ′ since f is efficient and the
same set of lotteries is efficient in R and R′. Finally, f ′ is strategyproof because f is strategyproof
and the outcomes of f ′ under the two profiles R′ and (R′)i 7→%
′
are equal to the outcomes of f under
the two (extended) profiles R and Ri 7→%, respectively. 
4.1 Framework, Anonymity, and Neutrality
For a given number of agents n and set of alternatives A, we encode an arbitrary SDS f : RN →
∆(A) by a set of real-valued variables pR,x with R ∈ RN and x ∈ A. Each pR,x then represents the
probability with which alternative x is selected for profile R, i.e., pR,x = f (R)(x).
This encoding of lotteries leads to the first simple constraints for our SMT encoding, which
ensure that for each preference profile R the corresponding variables pR,x , x ∈ A indeed encode a
lottery: ∑
x ∈A
pR,x = 1 for all R ∈ R
N , and
pR,x ≥ 0 for all R ∈ R
N and x ∈ A.
(Lottery)
We are now going to argue that, in conjunction with anonymity and neutrality (see Section 2), it
suffices to consider these constraints for a subset of preference profiles. This is because, in contrast
to the other axioms, we directly incorporate anonymity and neutrality into the structure of the en-
coding rather than formulating them as actual constraints. Similar to the construction involving
canonical tournament representations by Brandt and Geist [2016], we model anonymity and neu-
trality by computing for each preference profile R ∈ RN a canonical representation Rc ∈ RN with
respect to these properties. In this representation, two preference profiles R and R′ are equal (i.e.,
Rc = R
′
c
) iff one can be transformed into the other by renaming the agents and alternatives. Equiv-
alently, Rc = R′c iff, for every anonymous and neutral SDS f , the lotteries f (R) and f (R
′) are equal
(modulo the renaming of the alternatives).
The SMT constraints and SMT variables are then instantiated only for these canonical repre-
sentations RN
c
⊆ RN . Apart from enabling an encoding of anonymous and neutral SDSs without
any explicit reference to permutations, this also offers a substantial performance gain compared
to considering the full domain RN of (non-anonymous and non-neutral) preference profiles: the
number of preference profiles form = 4 and n = 4 is 31,640,625, whereas the number of canonical
preference profiles is merely 60,865.
Technically, we compute the canonical representation Rc as follows: Let R = (%1, . . . ,%n) ∈ RN
be a preference profile. First, we identify R with a function r : R → N, which we call anonymous
preference profile, and which counts the number of agents with a certain preference relation, i.e.,
r (%) = |{i ∈ N | %i = %}|, thereby ignoring the identity of the agents. This representation fully
captures anonymity.
To additionally enforce neutrality, we had to resort to a computationally demanding, naive so-
lution: given r , we compute all anonymous preference profiles π (r ) that can be achieved via a per-
mutation π : A → A, and, among those profiles, choose the one πlexmin(r ) with lexicographically
minimal values (for some fixed ordering of preference relations). For the canonical representation
Rc we then pick any preference profile R ∈ RN which agrees with πlexmin(r ), for instance, by again
using the same fixed ordering of preference relations. Fortunately, this approach is still feasible for
the small numbers of alternatives with which we are dealing.
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While this representation of preference profiles does not completely capture neutrality—the
orbit condition [see Brandt and Geist 2016] is missing—this weaker version suffices to prove the
impossibility. In favor of simpler proofs we, however, include the simple constraints corresponding
to a randomized version of the orbit condition.
In our context, an orbit O of a preference profile R is an equivalence class of alternatives. Two
alternatives x ,y ∈ A are considered equivalent if π (x) = y for some permutation π : A → A that
maps the anonymous preference profile associated with R to itself (i.e., π is an automorphism of
the anonymous preference profile). In such a situation, every anonymous and neutral SDS has to
assign equal probabilities to x and y. We hence require that, for each orbitO ∈ OR of a (canonical)
profile R, the probabilities pR,x are equal for all alternatives x ∈ O . As an SMT constraint, this
reads
pR,x = pR,y (Orbit)
for all R ∈ RN
c
, O ∈ OR , and x ,y ∈ O .
Example 4.2. Consider the anonymous preference profile r based on R from Example 2.2 and
the permutation π = (ab)(cd). As π (r ) = r (and since no other non-trivial permutation has this
property) the set of orbits of R is OR = {{a,b}, {c,d}}.
4.2 Stochastic Dominance
In order to avoid quantifying over utility functions, we leverage well-known representa-
tions of efficiency and strategyproofness via stochastic dominance (SD) [cf. Aziz et al. 2015;
Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001; McLennan 2002]. Lottery p stochastically dominates lottery q for
an agent i (short: p %SDi q) if for every alternative x , p is at least as likely as q to yield an alternative
at least as good as x . Formally,
p %SDi q iff
∑
y%ix
p(y) ≥
∑
y%ix
q(y) for all x ∈ A.
When p %SDi q and not q %
SD
i p we write p ≻
SD
i q.
As an example, consider the preference relation %i : a,b, c . We then have that
(2/3a + 1/3 c) ≻SDi (1/3a + 1/3b + 1/3 c)
while 2/3a + 1/3 c and b are incomparable based on stochastic dominance.
Lemma 4.3. Let %i ∈ R. A lottery p SD-dominates another lottery q for an agent i iff ui (p) ≥ ui (q)
for every utility function ui consistent with %i . As a consequence,
(1) an SDS f is efficient iff, for all R ∈ RN , there is no lottery p such that p %SDi f (R) for all i ∈ N
and p ≻SDi f (R) for some i ∈ N , and
(2) an SDS f is manipulable iff there exist a preference profileR, an agent i , and a preference relation
% such that f (Ri 7→%) ≻SDi f (R).
Proof. For the direction from left to right, assume that p %SDi q. Without loss of generality, let
A = {x1, . . . , xm} and x j %i xk if and only if j ≤ k for all j,k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then, by definition,
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
∑j
k=1 p(xk ) ≥
∑j
k=1 q(xk ). Let ui be a utility function consistent with %i , i.e.,
ui (x j ) ≥ ui (xk ) if and only if j ≤ k . Then,
ui (p) − ui (q) =
m∑
j=1
(p(x j) − q(x j ))ui (x j ) =
m∑
j=1
(ui (x j ) − ui (x j+1))︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
≥0
j∑
k=1
(p(xk ) − q(xk ))
︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
≥0
≥ 0,
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where ui (xm+1) is set to 0. Hence, ui (p) ≥ ui (q).
For the direction from right to left, assume that ui (p) ≥ ui (q) for all utility functions ui
consistent with %i . Assume for contradiction that p 6%SDi q, i.e., there is x ∈ A such that∑
y%ix q(x) −
∑
y%ix p(x) = ϵ > 0. Let ui be a utility function consistent with %i such that
ui (y) ∈ [1 − ϵ/2, 1] for all y %i x and ui (y) ∈ [0, ϵ/2] for all x ≻i y. Such a ui exists, since ϵ > 0.
Then,
ui (q) ≥ (1 − ϵ/2)
∑
y%ix
q(y) ≥
∑
y%ix
q(y) − ϵ/2 >
∑
y%ix
p(y) + ϵ/2 ≥ ui (p),
which contradicts the assumption. 
In words, Lemma 4.3 shows that an SDS f is efficient if and only if f (R) is Pareto-efficient
with respect to stochastic dominance for all preference profiles R. Secondly, f is manipulable if
and only if some agent can misrepresent his preferences to obtain a lottery that he prefers to the
lottery obtained by sincere voting with respect to stochastic dominance.
4.2.1 Encoding Strategyproofness. Starting from the above equivalence, encoding strate-
gyproofness as an SMT constraint is now a much simpler task. For each (canonical) preference
profile R ∈ RN
c
, agent i ∈ N ,9 and preference relation % ∈ R, we encode that the manipulated
outcome f (Ri 7→%) is not SD-preferred to the truthful outcome f (R) by agent i :
¬
(
f (Ri 7→%) ≻SDi f (R)
)
≡ f (Ri 7→%) 6%SDi f (R) ∨ f (R) %
SD
i f (R
i 7→%)
≡
(
(∃x ∈ A)
∑
y%ix
f (Ri 7→%)(y) <
∑
y%ix
f (R)(y)
)
∨
(
(∀x ∈ A)
∑
y%ix
f (Ri 7→%)(y)
(∗)
≤
∑
y%ix
f (R)(y)
)
≡
(∨
x ∈A
∑
y%ix
p
(Ri 7→%)c,π
Ri 7→%
c
(y)
<
∑
y%ix
pR,y
)
∨
(∧
x ∈A
∑
y%ix
p
(Ri 7→%)c,π
Ri 7→%
c
(y)
(∗∗)
=
∑
y%ix
pR,y
)
,
(Strategyproofness)
where πR
i 7→%
c
stands for a permutation of alternatives that (together with a potential renaming of
alternatives) leads fromRi 7→% to (Ri 7→%)c . The inequality (∗) can be replaced by the equality (∗∗) since
the case of at least one strict inequality is captured by the corresponding disjunctive condition one
line above.
4.2.2 Encoding Efficiency. While Lemma 4.3 helps to formulate efficiency as an SMT axiom it
is not yet sufficient because a quantification over the set of all lotteries ∆(A) remains. In order to
get rid of this quantifier, we apply two lemmas by Aziz et al. [2015], for which we include (slightly
simplified) proofs in favor of a self-contained presentation. The first lemma states that efficiency
of a lottery only depends on its support. The second lemma shows that deciding whether a lottery
is efficient reduces to solving a linear program.
Lemma 4.4 (Aziz et al., [2015]). Let R ∈ RN . A lottery p ∈ ∆(A) is efficient iff every lottery
p ′ ∈ ∆(A) with supp(p ′) ⊆ supp(p) is efficient.
Proof. We prove the statement by contraposition: if p ′ ∈ ∆(A) is not efficient, then no lottery
p with supp(p ′) ⊆ supp(p) is efficient. If p ′ is not efficient, there is q′ ∈ ∆(A) such that q′ u-
dominates p ′ for all utility representations uR , i.e., for all agents i ∈ N and all utility functions ui
9Note that, due to anonymity, it is not necessary to iterate over all agents i . Rather it suffices to pick one agent per
unique preference relation contained in R .
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consistent with %i , ui (q′) −ui (p ′) ≥ 0 and ui ′(q′) −ui ′(p ′) > 0 for some agent i ′ ∈ N and all utility
functions ui ′ consistent with %i ′ . Let v = q′ − p ′ ∈ RA. Note that, for all x ∈ A, v(x) < 0 implies
x ∈ supp(p ′). Now let ϵ > 0 small enough such that q = p + ϵv ∈ ∆(A). This is possible because
supp(p ′) ⊆ supp(p). By definition of q and linearity of ui , we have that, for all i ∈ N and all ui
consistent with %i , ui (q) − ui (p) = ϵui (v) = ϵ(ui (q′) − ui (p ′)) ≥ 0 and ui ′(q) − ui ′(p) > 0 for all ui ′
consistent with %i ′ . Thus, p is not efficient, contradicting the assumption. 
Lemma 4.5 (Aziz et al., [2015]). Whether a lottery p ∈ ∆(A) is efficient for a given preference
profile R can be computed in polynomial time by solving a linear program.
Proof. Given the equivalence from Lemma 4.3, a lottery p is easily seen to be efficient iff the
optimal objective value of the following linear program is zero (since then there is no lottery q
that SD-dominates p):
max
q
∑
i ∈N
∑
x ∈A
∑
y%ix
qy − py
subject to
∑
y%ix
qy ≥
∑
y%ix
py for all x ∈ A, i ∈ N ,
∑
x ∈A
qx = 1, qx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ A.

Recall that an SDS is efficient if it never returns a dominated lottery. By Lemma 4.4, this is
equivalent to never returning a lottery with inefficient support. To capture this, we encode, for
each (canonical) preference profile R ∈ RN
c
, that the probability for at least one alternative in
every (inclusion-minimal) inefficient support IR ⊆ A is zero:∨
x ∈IR
pR,x = 0. (Efficiency)
Given a preference profile R and a support IR , it can be decided in polynomial time whether IR
is inefficient by checking for an arbitrary lottery with support IR whether it is efficient and then
applying Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5. The set of inclusion-minimal inefficient supports can be found by
iterating over all supports. For a small number of alternatives this is feasible even though the
number of possible supports is exponential in the number of alternatives.
4.3 Restricted Domains
Since RSD is known to satisfy both strategyproofness and efficiency when there are only up to
3 alternatives or only up to 3 agents and 5 alternatives [Aziz et al. 2016], the search for an impos-
sibility has to start at m = 4 alternatives and n = 4 agents. For these parameters, an encoding
of the full domain, unfortunately, becomes prohibitively large. Hence, form = 4 and n = 4, one
has to carefully optimize the domain under consideration, on the one hand, to include a sufficient
number of profiles for a successful proof, and, on the other hand, not to include too many profiles,
which would prevent the solver from terminating within a reasonable amount of time.
The following incremental strategy was found to be successful. We start with a specific profile
R, from which we only consider sequences of potential manipulations as long as (in each step) the
manipulated individual preferences are not too distinct from the truthful preferences. To this end,
we measure the magnitude of manipulations by the Kendall tau distance τ , which counts pairwise
disagreements between Ri and R′i [see also Sato 2013]. A change in the individual preferences of
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an agent will be called a k-manipulation if τ (Ri ,R′i ) ≤ k . Then, for example, strategically swapping
two alternatives is a 2-manipulation, and breaking or introducing a tie between two alternatives
is a 1-manipulation.
On the domain which starts from the preference profile R given in Example 2.2 and from there
allows sequences of (1, 2, 1, 2)-manipulations,wewere able to prove the result within a fewminutes
of running-time.10,11 On smaller domains (e.g., when considering (1, 2, 2)-manipulations from R),
the axioms are still compatible.
4.4 Verification of Correctness
Themain drawbacks of the SMT-based proof are that (i) one must trust the correctness of the SMT
solver, (ii) one must trust the correctness of the program that performs the encoding into SMT-LIB,
and (iii) the proof is unstructured and completely unlike a hand-written mathematical argument,
which makes it virtually impossible to be checked by humans.
In order to tackle the first issue, we used z3 to generate a minimal unsatisfiable set (MUS) of
constraints, i.e., an inclusion-minimal set of constraints such that this set is still unsatisfiable [see,
also, Brandt and Geist 2016]. A MUS corresponding to Theorem 3.1 consists of 94 constraints, not
counting the (trivial) lottery definitions. This MUS, annotated with e.g., the 47 required canonical
preference profiles, is available as part of an arXiv version of this paper [Brandl et al. 2016a]. The
unsatisfiability of the MUS has been verified by the solvers CVC4, MathSAT, Yices2, and z3.
We addressed the second issue by performing several sanity checks such as running solvers
on multiple variants of the encoding which represent known theorems. This way, we reproduced
(amongst others) the results by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001] and Katta and Sethuraman [2006],
as well as the possibility result form < 4.
To finally remove any doubt about correctness and simultaneously address the third issue, we
translated the MUS into an independent proof, which no longer relies on SMT, within the in-
teractive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [Nipkow and Klein 2014; Nipkow et al. 2002]. Isabelle is a
generic interactive theorem prover where interactive means that the prover does not find the proof
by itself like an automated theorem prover—the user must give it a sequence of steps to follow and
the prover’s automation fills in the gaps. This allows proofs of more complex theorems that are out-
side the scope of fully-automated theorem provers. The proof of Theorem 3.1 in Isabelle is about
400 lines long, but still fairly legible since it consists of many individual small proofs. The fact
that Isabelle can automatically simplify inequalities using all facts proven so far actually makes
conducting the proof in the system much easier, less tedious, and less error-prone than on pa-
per. Moreover, all aspects of the proof—including formal definitions of the social-choice-theoretic
concepts, the reduction of the general case to that of m = 4 and n = 4, the generation of the
constraints arising from the 47 canonical preference profiles, and the proof of the inconsistency of
these constraints (which corresponds to the SMT proof)—have been verified by Isabelle/HOL.
The trustworthiness of such a proof stems from the fact that all Isabelle proofs are broken down
into small logical inference steps, which are checked by Isabelle’s kernel. Since only the kernel can
produce new theorems, it is sufficient to trust it to correctly implement these inference steps to
trust that any proof it accepts really does hold in the underlying logic. Furthermore, the mere act of
breaking down proofs into such small steps exposes many mistakes and forgotten side conditions.
10I.e., first we allow any 1-manipulation from R , then, from every resulting profile, any 2-manipulation is allowed (not
necessarily by the same agent), and so forth. Showing the result on this domain implies a slightly stronger statement where
strategyproofness only has to hold for “small” lies (of at most Kendall tau distance 2).
11The SMT solverMathSAT [Cimatti et al. 2013] terminates quickly within less than 3 minutes with the suggested com-
petition settings, whereas z3 [de Moura and Bjørner 2008] requires some additional configuration, but then also supports
core extraction within the same time frame.
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Statement Number of canonical preference profiles
Theorem 3.1 47
Brandl et al. [2016b, Theorem 1] 13
Aziz et al. [2014, Theorem 3] 10
Aziz et al. [2014, Theorem 2] 7
Aziz et al. [2014, Theorem 4] 7
Aziz et al. [2013b, Theorem 1] 5
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [2001, Theorem 2] 11
Kasajima [2013, Theorem 1] 9
Nesterov [2017, Theorem 2] 8
Nesterov [2017, Theorem 1] 6
Zhou [1990, Theorem 1] 5
Aziz and Kasajima [2017, Theorem 1] 4
Aziz and Kasajima [2017, Theorem 2] 3
Kojima [2009, Theorem 1] 3
Katta and Sethuraman [2006, Section 4] 2
Nesterov [2017, Theorem 1] 2
Table 1. Proof complexity comparison of impossibility statements using efficiency and strategyproofness in
terms of the number of canonical preference profiles used in the proof. The statements in the lower part of
the table have been proven for the assignment domain.
The Isabelle proof is available in the Archive of Formal Proofs [Eberl 2016b], which is a peer-
reviewed online repository of Isabelle proofs. For more details on the background in Isabelle and
how the proof was obtained from the MUS, we refer to [Eberl 2016a]. A human-readable version
of this proof is given in Appendix A.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have leveraged computer-aided solving techniques to prove a sweeping impossi-
bility for randomized aggregation mechanisms. In particular, we have reduced the statement to a
finite propositional formula using linear arithmetic, which was then shown to be unsatisfiable by
an SMT solver. A crucial step in the construction of the formula was to find a restricted domain of
preference profiles that is not too large yet sufficient for the impossibility to hold.
It seems unlikely that this proof would have been found without the help of computers because
manual proofs of significantly weaker statements already turned out to be quite complex (see
Table 1 for a comparison of the proof complexity of related statements). Nevertheless, now that
the theorem has been established, our computer-aided methods may guide the search for related,
perhaps even stronger statements that allow for more intuitive proofs and provide more insights
into randomized social choice.
Generally speaking, we believe that SMT solving and subsequent verification via Isabelle is
applicable to a wide range of problems in social choice and, more generally, in microeconomic
theory [see Geist and Peters 2017]. In particular, extending our result to the special domain of
assignment (see Section 3.2) is desirable as this would strengthen a number of existing theorems.
Other interesting questions are whether the impossibility still holds when weakening efficiency
and strategyproofness even further or when omitting neutrality [see Brandt 2017].
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving 13
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based upon work supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under
grants BR 2312/7-2 and BR 2312/10-1 and the TUM Institute for Advanced Study through a
Hans Fischer Senior Fellowship. The authors also thank Alberto Griggio and Mohammad Mehdi
PourhashemKallehbasti for guidance on how tomost effectively useMathSAT and z3, respectively,
and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
Results of this paper were presented at the 6th InternationalWorkshop on Computational Social
Choice (Toulouse, June 2016) and the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(New York, July 2016).
REFERENCES
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. 2014. On the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social
Choice. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). AAAI Press, 545–551.
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, and F. Brandt. 2015. Universal Pareto Dominance and Welfare for Plausible Utility Functions. Journal
of Mathematical Economics 60 (2015), 123–133.
H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. 2016. On the Tradeoff between Efficiency and Strategyproofness. (2016). Working
paper.
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. 2013a. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship. Economics Letters
121, 3 (2013), 341–345.
H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. 2013b. On the Tradeoff between Economic Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized
Social Choice. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference onAutonomousAgents andMultiagent Systems (AAMAS).
IFAAMAS, 455–462.
H. Aziz and Y. Kasajima. 2017. Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment. Social Choice and Welfare 49, 2 (2017), 255–275.
C. Barrett, M. Deters, L. de Moura, A. Oliveras, and A. Stump. 2013. 6 Years of SMT-COMP. Journal of Automated Reasoning
50, 3 (2013), 243–277.
C. Barrett, A. Stump, and C. Tinelli. 2010. The SMT-LIB Standard: Version 2.0. In Proceedings of the 8th International
Workshop on Satisfiability Modulo Theories.
A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. 2001. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem. Journal of Economic Theory
100, 2 (2001), 295–328.
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and C. Geist. 2016a. Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving.
Technical Report. http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.05692.
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, C. Geist, and J. Hofbauer. 2015. Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results
and Computer-Generated Impossibilities. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI). AAAI Press, 18–24.
F. Brandl, F. Brandt, andW. Suksompong. 2016b. The Impossibility of Extending Random Dictatorship toWeak Preferences.
Economics Letters 141 (2016), 44–47.
F. Brandt. 2017. Rolling the Dice: Recent Results in Probabilistic Social Choice. In Trends in Computational Social Choice,
U. Endriss (Ed.). AI Access, Chapter 1. Forthcoming.
F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. Procaccia (Eds.). 2016a. Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cam-
bridge University Press.
F. Brandt and C. Geist. 2016. Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research 55 (2016), 565–602.
F. Brandt, C. Geist, and D. Peters. 2016b. Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving. In Proceedings of the
15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS). IFAAMAS, 314–322.
A. Cimatti, A. Griggio, B. Schaafsma, and R. Sebastiani. 2013. The MathSAT5 SMT Solver. In Proceedings of TACAS (Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)), Vol. 7795. Springer-Verlag, 93–107.
L. de Moura and N. Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An Efficient SMT Solver. In Proceedings of TACAS (Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS)), Vol. 7795. Springer-Verlag, 337–340.
O. Dowlen. 2009. Sorting Out Sortition: A Perspective on the Random Selection of Political Officers. Political Studies 57, 2
(2009), 298–315.
J. Duggan. 1996. A geometric proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship theorem. Economic Theory 7, 2 (1996), 365–369.
B. Dutta, H. Peters, and A. Sen. 2007. Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare 28, 1 (2007),
163–179.
M. Eberl. 2016a. A Formal Proof of the Incompatibility of SD-Efficiency and SD-Strategy-Proofness. Bachelor’s thesis. Tech-
nische Universität München.
14 Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, and Christian Geist
M. Eberl. 2016b. The Incompatibility of SD-efficiency and SD-strategy-proofness. Archive of Formal Proofs (2016).
http://isa-afp.org/entries/SDS_Impossibility.shtml
D. Gale. 1987. College Course Assignments and Optimal Lotteries. (1987). Mimeo.
C. Geist and U. Endriss. 2011. Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of
Objects. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 40 (2011), 143–174.
C. Geist and D. Peters. 2017. Computer-aided Methods for Social Choice Theory. In Trends in Computational Social Choice,
U. Endriss (Ed.). Chapter 13. Forthcoming.
A. Gibbard. 1973. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result. Econometrica 41, 4 (1973), 587–601.
A. Gibbard. 1977. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 45, 3 (1977), 665–681.
A. Guerrero. 2014. Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative. Philosophy and Public Affairs 42, 2 (2014), 135–178.
J. W. Headlam. 1933. Election by Lot at Athens. Cambridge University Press.
Y. Kasajima. 2013. Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences. Social Choice and Welfare
41, 1 (2013), 203–215.
A.-K. Katta and J. Sethuraman. 2006. A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain. Journal
of Economic Theory 131, 1 (2006), 231–250.
F. Kojima. 2009. Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. Mathematical Social Sciences 57, 1 (2009), 134–142.
A. McLennan. 2002. Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem. Journal of Economic Theory
105, 2 (2002), 435–449.
S. Nandeibam. 1997. An alternative proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship result. Social Choice and Welfare 15, 4 (1997),
509–519.
A. Nesterov. 2017. Fairness and Efficiency in Strategy-proof Object Allocation Mechansims. Journal of Economic Theory
(2017). Forthcoming.
T. Nipkow and G. Klein. 2014. Concrete Semantics: With Isabelle/HOL. Springer-Verlag.
T. Nipkow, L. C. Paulson, and M. Wenzel. 2002. Isabelle/HOL – A Proof Assistant for Higher-Order Logic. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (LNCS), Vol. 2283. Springer-Verlag.
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, and V. Vazirani. 2007. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.
A. Postlewaite and D. Schmeidler. 1986. Strategic behaviour and a notion of Ex Ante efficiency in a voting model. Social
Choice and Welfare 3, 1 (1986), 37–49.
J. Rothe (Ed.). 2015. Economics and Computation: An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice,
and Fair Division. Springer.
S. Sato. 2013. Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders. Social Choice and Welfare
40, 2 (2013), 479–494.
M. A. Satterthwaite. 1975. Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting
Procedures and Social Welfare Functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10, 2 (1975), 187–217.
Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown. 2009. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Y. Tanaka. 2003. An alternative proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship theorem. Review of Economic Design 8 (2003),
319–328.
P. Tang and F. Lin. 2009. Computer-aided proofs of Arrow’s and other impossibility theorems. Artificial Intelligence 173,
11 (2009), 1041–1053.
L. Zhou. 1990. On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems. Journal of Economic Theory 52, 1 (1990),
123–135.
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving 15
A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
A.1 Main Proof
We will now give the complete human-readable proof of Theorem 3.1. This proof is essentially a
paraphrased version of the formal Isabelle/HOL proof, which is available in the AFP entry [Eberl
2016b].
Our general approach will be to attempt to “solve” preference profiles, i.e., determine the exact
value of f (Ri )(x) (which we write as pi,x ) for a profile Ri and an alternative x . Whenever this is
not possible, we try to express pi,x in terms of other pj,y or at least find simple inequalities that
the pi,x satisfy. We do this until we have gained enough knowledge about the SDS to derive a
contradiction.
A typical step in the proofs will be to pick a strategyproofness condition (which usually consist
of several disjunctions) and simplify it with all the knowledge that we have—substituting the pi,x
whose values we already know, e.g., substituting pi,d = 1 − pi,a if we know that pi,b = pi,c = 0.
We will use the fact that all pi,x are non-negative and that
∑
x ∈A pi,x = 1 without mentioning it
explicitly.
Every step of the proof (i.e., “Condition X simplifies to . . . ” or “Condition X implies . . . ”) is
elementary in the sense that it can by solved automatically by Isabelle—in fact, the proof printed
here is often considerablymore verbose andwithmore intermediate steps thanwould be necessary
in Isabelle. Still, for a human, most of these steps will require a few steps of reasoning on paper.
We chose not to go into more detail of the individual steps, since it would only have made the
proof even longer and less readable.
The proof will reference orbit equations, efficiency conditions, and strategyproofness condi-
tions on the set of 47 preference profiles mentioned before. As an aid to the reader, the proof
contains tables listing all the knowledge that we currently have about the probabilities of the
lottery returned by the hypothetical SDS after every few steps.
We start by listing the 47 preference profiles used in the proof by giving the weak rankings of
each agent.
Profile Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
R1 {c,d}, {a,b} {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} {a, c}, {b,d}
R2 {a, c}, {b,d} {c,d},a,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d}
R3 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} d, {a,b}, c c,a, {b,d}
R4 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,d}, {b, c} c, {a,b},d d, c, {a,b}
R5 {c,d}, {a,b} {a,b}, {c,d} {a, c},d,b d, {a,b}, c
R6 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c}, {b,d} d,b,a, c
R7 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} a, c,d,b d, {a,b}, c
R8 {a,b}, {c,d} {a, c}, {b,d} d, {a,b}, c d, c, {a,b}
R9 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,d}, c,b d, c, {a,b} {a,b, c},d
R10 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c},d,b {b,d},a, c
R11 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} d, {a,b}, c c,a,b,d
R12 {c,d}, {a,b} {a,b}, {c,d} {a, c},d,b {a,b,d}, c
R13 {a, c}, {b,d} {c,d},a,b {b,d},a, c a,b,d, c
R14 {a,b}, {c,d} d, c, {a,b} {a,b, c},d a,d, c,b
R15 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {b,d},a, c a, c,d,b
R16 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} a, c,d,b {a,b,d}, c
R17 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c}, {b,d} d, {a,b}, c
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R18 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,d}, {b, c} {a,b, c},d d, c, {a,b}
R19 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {b,d},a, c {a, c}, {b,d}
R20 {b,d},a, c b,a, {c,d} a, c, {b,d} d, c, {a,b}
R21 {a,d}, c,b d, c, {a,b} c, {a,b},d a,b, {c,d}
R22 {a, c},d,b d, c, {a,b} d, {a,b}, c a,b, {c,d}
R23 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c}, {b,d} {a,b,d}, c
R24 {c,d}, {a,b} d,b,a, c c,a, {b,d} b,a, {c,d}
R25 {c,d}, {a,b} {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} a, c, {b,d}
R26 {b,d}, {a, c} {c,d}, {a,b} a,b, {c,d} a, c, {b,d}
R27 {a,b}, {c,d} {b,d},a, c {a, c}, {b,d} {c,d},a,b
R28 {c,d},a,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} a, c, {b,d}
R29 {a, c},d,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} d, c, {a,b}
R30 {a,d}, c,b d, c, {a,b} c, {a,b},d {a,b},d, c
R31 {b,d},a, c {a, c},d,b c,d, {a,b} {a,b}, c,d
R32 {a, c},d,b d, c, {a,b} d, {a,b}, c {a,b},d, c
R33 {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c},d,b a,b, {c,d} d, {a,b}, c
R34 {a,b}, {c,d} a, c,d,b b, {a,d}, c c,d, {a,b}
R35 {a,d}, c,b a,b, {c,d} {a,b, c},d d, c, {a,b}
R36 {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c},d,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d}
R37 {a, c}, {b,d} {b,d}, {a, c} a,b, {c,d} c,d, {a,b}
R38 {c,d},a,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} {a, c},b,d
R39 {a, c},d,b {b,d},a, c a,b, {c,d} {c,d},a,b
R40 {a,d}, c,b {a,b}, c,d {a,b, c},d d, c, {a,b}
R41 {a,d}, c,b {a,b},d, c {a,b, c},d d, c, {a,b}
R42 {c,d}, {a,b} {a,b}, {c,d} d,b,a, c c,a, {b,d}
R43 {a,b}, {c,d} {c,d}, {a,b} d, {a,b}, c a, {c,d},b
R44 {c,d}, {a,b} {a, c},d,b {a,b},d, c {a,b,d}, c
R45 {a, c},d,b {b,d},a, c {a,b}, c,d {c,d},b,a
R46 {b,d},a, c d, c, {a,b} {a, c}, {b,d} b,a, {c,d}
R47 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,d}, c,b d, c, {a,b} c, {a,b},d
Table 2. The 47 preference profiles used in the proof.
Now, to begin with the proof, we shall first focus on those profiles that have rich symmetries
(i.e., orbit conditions) and restrictive efficiency conditions (e.g., by admitting Pareto dominated
alternatives).
Table 3 lists profile automorphisms, i.e., permutations of the alternatives such that applying
the permutation to the profile yields a profile that is anonymity-equivalent to the original profile.
Given such a profile, an anonymous and neutral SDS must return the same probability for all alter-
natives contained in the same orbit of the permutation. To increase readability, the permutations
are already written as a product of their orbits; for instance, the first orbit condition states that
p10,a = p10,d and p10,b = p10,c .
Profile Permutation
R10 (a d)(b c)
R26 (a)(b c)(d)
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R27 (a)(b c)(d)
R28 (a)(b c)(d)
R29 (a d)(b c)
R43 (a d)(b c)
R45 (a b d c)
Table 3. The relevant profile automorphisms, wrien as a product of their orbits.
There are efficiency conditions of two different types: those derived from ex post efficiency alone
assert that Pareto dominated alternatives have to be assigned probability 0, whereas those derived
from SD-efficiency (but not ex post efficiency) assert that at least one of two alternatives has to be
assigned probability 0.
Alternative b is Pareto dominated in the following profiles and must therefore be assigned prob-
ability 0 by any ex post efficient SDS (and thereby also by any SD-efficient SDS):
R3, R4, R5, R7, R8, R9, R11, R12, R14, R16, R17, R18 , R21, R22 , R23, R30, R32, R33, R35, R40, R41 ,
R43 , R44, R47
We will use the fact that f (R)(b) = 0 for all of these profiles without mentioning it explicitly.
Moreover, {b, c} is an SD-inefficient support in the following profiles (i.e., any SD-efficient SDS
must assign probability 0 to at least one of b and c):
R10 , R15, R19, R25, R26 , R27, R28, R29, R39
To see that this is true, note that the lottery 1/2a + 1/2d strictly Pareto dominates the lottery 1/2b +
1/2 c for each of these profiles.
Using the orbit and efficiency conditions we arrive at the following conclusions:
• The orbit conditions of R45 imply p45,a = p45,b = p45,c = p45,d = 1/4.
• The efficiency conditions for R10 state that at least one of p10,b and p10,c is 0, and since the
orbit conditions state that p10,b = p10,c , we have p10,b = p10,c = 0.
• In the same fashion, we can show that pi,x = 0 for i ∈ {26, 27, 28, 29} and x ∈ {b, c}. For R29,
the orbit condition then additionally implies p29,a = p29,d = 1/2, and analogously for R10.
• The efficiency conditions for R43 state p43,b = p43,c = 0, and with the orbit condition p43,a =
p43,d we have p43,a = p43,d = 1/2.
In summary, we have now derived the following information about the profiles:
R10 R26 R27 R28 R29 R43 R45
a 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/4
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/4
• Suppose p39,c = 0. Then (S29,39) implies p39,d ≤ 1/2 and (S39,29) then implies p39,b = 0. Since
the efficiency condition for R39 states that p39,b = 0 or p39,c = 0, we can conclude that, in
any case, p39,b = 0.
• Using this, (S39,29) now simplifies to p39,a ≤ 1/2.
• (S10,36) simplifies top36,a+p36,b ≤ 1/2. Using this, (S36,10) simplifies to p36,a = 1/2 and p36,b = 0.
• (S36,39) simplifies to p39,a ≥ 1/2. Using this, (S39,36) simplifies to p39,a = 1/2.
• (S12,10) simplifies to p12,a + p12,d ≥ 1, which implies p12,c = 0.
• (S10,12) then simplifies to p12,a ≥ 1/2.
• (S12,44) simplifies to p44,a ≤ p12,a . Using this, (S44,12) simplifies to p44,a = p12,a and p44,c = 0.
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• (S9,35) simplifies to p35,a ≤ p9,a , and then (S35,9) simplifies to p9,a = p35,a .
• (S9,18) states that p9,a + p9,d ≤ p18,a + p18,d , and then (S9,18) simplifies to p18,c = p9,c .
To summarize:
R9 R10 R12 R18 R26 R27 R28 R29 R36 R39 R43 R44 R45
a p35,a 1/2 ≥ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 p12,a 1/4
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
c 0 0 p9,c 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
d 1/2 ≤ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 − p12,a 1/4
• (S5,10) implies p5,d ≥ 1/2.
• (S5,17) implies p5,d ≤ p17,d , and (S17,7) simplifies to p17,d ≤ p7,d . Combined with p5,d ≥ 1/2
from above, we havep7,d ≥ 1/2. Using this, (S7,43) impliesp7,a = 1/2 andp7,c = 0, and therefore
p7,d = 1/2.
• (S5,7) now simplifies to p5,d ≤ 1/2, and p5,d ≥ 1/2 was already shown, so we have p5,d = 1/2.
• (S5,10) now simplifies to p5,c = 0, and it is then clear that p5,a = 1/2.
• Suppose p15,b = 0. Then (S10,15) simplifies to p15,a+p15,c ≤ 1/2 and, using that, (S15,10) implies
p15,c = 0. Since the efficiency conditions for R15 tell us that p15,b = 0 or p15,c = 0, we can
conclude p15,c = 0.
• (S15,5) then implies p15,a ≥ 1/2 and (S15,7) implies p15,a ≤ 1/2. We can conclude that p15,a = 1/2.
• (S15,5) now simplifies to p15,d = 1/2 and p15,b = 0.
• (S27,13) simplifies to p13,a +p13,b ≤ p27,a . Using that, (S13,27) simplifies to p13,b = p13,c = 0 and
p27,a = p13,a .
• (S15,13) now implies p13,a ≥ 1/2 and (S13,15) simplifies to p13,a ≤ 1/2, so that we can conclude
p13,a = p13,d = p27,a = p27,d = 1/2.
We summarize what we have learned so far:
R5 R7 R9 R10 R12 R13 R15 R18 R26 R27 R28 R29
a 1/2 1/2 p35,a 1/2 ≥ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 p9,c 0 0 0 0
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 ≤ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
R36 R39 R43 R44 R45
a 1/2 1/2 1/2 p12,a 1/4
b 0 0 0 0 1/4
c 0 0 1/4
d 1/2 1 − p12,a 1/4
• Wewill now determine the probabilities for R19. The efficiency condition tells us that p19,b =
0 or p19,c = 0.
– Suppose p19,b = 0. Then (S10,19) simplifies to p19,a + p19,c ≤ 1/2 and (S19,10) simplifies to
p19,a + p19,c = 1/2. We can therefore conclude that p19,d = 1/2. Using this, (S27,19) then
simplifies to p19,a = 1/2 and p19,c = 0 and therefore p19,d = 1/2.
– Suppose p19,c = 0. Then (S19,10) simplifies to p19,a ≥ 1/2 and (S19,27) simplifies to p19,d ≥ 1/2.
This clearly implies p19,a = p19,d = 1/2 and p19,b = 0.
• Using this, (S19,1) simplifies to p1,a + p1,b ≤ 1/2, and with that, (S1,19) simplifies to p1,a = 1/2
and p1,b = 0.
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• (S33,5) simplifies to p33,a ≥ 1/2. Moreover, (S33,22) simplifies to p22,c +p22,d ≤ p33,c +p33,d , i.e.,
p33,a ≤ p22,a . We therefore have p22,a ≥ 1/2. Using this, (S22,29) simplifies to p22,a = p22,d = 1/2
and therefore also p22,c = 0.
• (S32,28) implies p28,a ≤ p32,d . Then (S28,32) implies p32,d = p28,a . Moreover, (S22,32) simplifies
to p32,a ≤ 1. Using these two facts, (S32,22) implies p32,d = 1/2 and therefore also p28,a =
p28,d = 1/2.
• (S28,39) now simplifies to p39,c = 0, and since we have already determined p39,a = 1/2 and
p39,b = 0, we can conclude p39,d = 1/2.
• (S1,2) states that p2,c +p2,d ≤ p1,c +p2,d . Using this, (S2,1) simplifies to p2,a = p2,c +p2,d = 1/2
and therefore also p2,b = 0. Using this, (S39,2) simplifies to p2,c = 0 and p2,d = 1/2.
• We will now determine R42:
– (S17,5) simplifies to p17,a + p17,c ≥ 1/2 and (S5,17) simplifies to p17,a + p17,c ≤ 1/2, so we can
conclude p17,d = 1/2.
– (S6,42) states that p42,a + p42,c ≤ p6,a + p6,c and (S6,19) implies p6,a + p6,c ≤ 1/2. We can
therefore conclude that p42,a + p42,c ≤ 1/2.
– (S17,11) states that p11,a + p11,c ≤ p17,a + p17,c . Since p11,b = p17,b = 0, this is equivalent to
p11,d ≥ p17,d = 1/2 ≥ p42,a + p42,c . With this, (S42,11) implies p42,c ≥ p11,d ≥ 1/2.
– (S17,3) simplifies to p3,a + p3,c ≤ p17,a + p17,c ; i.e., p3,d ≥ p17,d = 1/2.
– Finally, using p42,c ≥ 1/2 and p3,d ≥ 1/2, (S42,3) simplifies to p42,c ≥ 1/2 and p42,d ≥ 1/2 and
therefore p42,a = p42,b = 0 and p42,c = p42,d = 1/2.
• Using these values for R42, the two conditions (S37,42 (1)) and (S37,42 (2)) now simplify to
p37,a = 1/2 or p37,a +p37,b > 1/2, and p37,c = 1/2 or p37,c +p37,d > 1/2. Together, these obviously
imply p37,a = p37,c = 1/2 and p37,b = p37,d = 0.
• Similarly, R24 simplifies to p24,a + p24,b ≤ 0 and therefore p24,a = p24,b = 0.
R1 R2 R5 R7 R9 R10 R12 R13 R15 R18 R19 R22 R24
a 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 p35,a 1/2 ≥ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p9,c 0 0
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 ≤ 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
R26 R27 R28 R29 R36 R37 R39 R42 R43 R44 R45
a 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 p12,a 1/4
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
c 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 1/4
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 − p12,a 1/4
• (S24,34) implies p34,b ≤ p24,c and (S34,24) implies p24,c ≤ p34,b ; we therefore have p34,b = p24,c .
Using this, (S34,24) simplifies to p34,c = 0 and (S24,34) simplifies to p34,d = 0.
• (S14,34) now simplifies to p14,a + p14,c ≥ 1, so we have p14,b = p14,d = 0.
• (S46,37) simplifies to p46,a = p46,c = 0.
• (S46,20) now simplifies to p20,a + p20,c ≤ 0, so we have p20,a = p20,c = 0.
• (S20,21) now simplifies to p21,b = p21,c = 0.
• (S12,16) simplifies to p16,a + p16,c ≤ p12,a .
• We now determine the probabilities for p16,c :
– (S44,40) simplifies to p12,a ≤ p40,a . Moreover, (S9,40) simplifies to p40,a ≤ p9,a . Combined
with p16,a + p16,c ≤ p12,a , this implies p16,a + p16,c ≤ p9,a .
– (S14,16) implies p16,a ≥ p14,a .
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– Combining the last two facts, we obtain p16,c ≤ p9,a − p14,a . Moreover, (S14,9) implies
p9,a − p14,a ≤ 0. Combining this, we have p16,c = 0.
• Therefore, the fact p16,a + p16,c ≤ p12,a , which we have shown before, now simplifies to
p16,a ≤ p12,a .
• Since (S14,16) simplifies to p14,a ≤ p16,a , we then have p14,a ≤ p12,a .
R1 R2 R5 R7 R9 R10 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16 R18 R19
a 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 p35,a 1/2 ≥ 1/2 1/2 ≤ p12,a 1/2 1/2
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p9,c 0
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 ≤ 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2
R20 R21 R22 R24 R26 R27 R28 R29 R34 R36 R37 R39
a 0 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 − p24,c 1/2 1/2 1/2
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p24,c 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
d 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1/2
R42 R43 R44 R45 R46
a 0 1/2 p12,a 1/4 0
b 0 0 0 1/4
c 1/2 0 0 1/4 0
d 1/2 1/2 1 − p12,a 1/4
• We now show that p12,a = p9,a = p35,a :
– (S14,9) implies p9,a ≤ p14,a . Since p14,a ≤ p12,a , we have p9,a ≤ p12,a .
– (S44,40) simplifies to p12,a ≤ p40,a . Moreover, (S9,40) simplifies to p40,a ≤ p9,a ; therefore, we
have p12,a ≤ p9,a .
– Combining these two inequalities yields p12,a = p9,a .
• Recall that p14,a ≤ p12,a = p9,a . Then (S14,9) simplifies to p9,a = p14,a and p9,d = 0.
• (S23,19) simplifies to p23,a + p23,d ≥ 1 and therefore p23,b = p23,c = 0.
• (S35,21) simplifies to p21,a ≤ p35,a +p35,c . Then (S21,35) simplifies to p35,c = 0 and p35,a = p21,a .
• Next, we derive the probabilities for R18:
– (S23,12) simplifies to p21,a ≤ p23,a .
– (S23,18) simplifies top18,c+p18,d ≤ 1−p23,a . Sincep18,c = p9,c = 1−p9,a = 1−p35,a = 1−p21,a ,
this is equivalent to p18,d ≤ p21,a − p23,a . Recall that p9,b = p9,c = 0, i.e., p18,c = p9,c =
1−p9,a = 1−p35,a = 1−p21,a . Substituting this in the inequality we have just derived and
rearranging yields p18,d ≤ p21,a − p23,a .
– Since p21,a ≤ p23,a , the right-hand side of the above inequality is 0 and therefore p18,d = 0.
Now we can derive the probabilities for R4:
– (S47,30) simplifies to p30,a ≤ p47,a .
– (S4,47) simplifies to p47,a + p47,d ≤ p4,a + p4,d , i.e., p4,c ≤ p47,c .
– Adding these two inequalities, we obtain p4,c + p30,a ≤ 1 − p47,d .
– (S30,21) simplifies to p21,a ≤ p30,a , and with the previous inequality, we obtain p4,c +p21,a ≤
1 − p47,d ≤ 1. Substituting p21,a = p14,a yields p4,c + p14,a ≤ 1.
– (S4,18) now simplifies to p4,d = 0 and p4,c = p21,d .
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• (S8,26) implies p26,a ≤ p8,d . Using this, (S26,8) simplifies to p26,a = p8,d . Using this, we look
at (S8,26) again and find that it now simplifies to p8,a + p8,d = 1, i.e., p8,c = p8,b = 0 and
p26,a = 1 − p8,a .
R1 R2 R4 R5 R7 R8 R9 R10 R12 R13 R14
a 1/2 1/2 p21,a 1/2 1/2 p21,a 1/2 p21,a 1/2 p21,a
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 1 − p21,a 0 0 0 1 − p21,a 0 0 0 1 − p21,a
d 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1 − p21,a 1/2 0
R15 R16 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 R24 R26 R27 R28
a 1/2 p21,a 1/2 0 1/2 0 1 − p8,a 1/2 1/2
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 1 − p21,a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 p8,a 1/2 1/2
R29 R34 R35 R36 R37 R39 R42 R43 R44 R45 R46
a 1/2 1 − p24,c p21,a 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 p12,a 1/4 0
b 0 p24,c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4
c 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0 0 1/4 0
d 1/2 0 1 − p21,a 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 − p12,a 1/4
• (S4,47) simplifies to p21,d ≤ p47,c .
• (S47,30) simplifies to p30,a ≤ p47,a . With this and the previous inequality, (S30,21) simplifies to
p30,b = p30,c = 0 and p30,a = p47,a .
• The last big and crucial step is to show that p31,c ≥ 1/2:
– The efficiency conditions for R25 tell us that p25,b = 0 or p25,c = 0. If p25,c = 0, then (S25,36)
immediately implies p25,a ≥ 1/2. If, on the other hand, p25,b = 0, then (S36,25) implies
p25,a + p25,c ≤ p36,c + 1/2, with which (S25,36) then also implies p25,a ≥ 1/2.
– Using p25,a ≥ 1/2, the condition (S25,26) implies p26,a ≥ 1/2, and therefore also 1/2 ≤ p26,a +
p47,d = 1 − p8,a + p47,d .
– Now observe that (S4,8) simplifies to p21,a ≤ p8,a , which is equivalent to 1 − p8,a ≤ p21,d .
Combined with p21,d ≤ p47,c , which we have shown before, we now have 1/2 ≤ p47,c +p47,d .
– (S30,41) implies p41,a + p41,c ≤ p47,a , which is equivalent to p47,c + p47,d ≤ p41,d .
– (S41,31) simplifies to p31,a +p31,b +p31,d ≤ p41,a +p41,c , which is equivalent to p41,d ≤ p31,c .
– Combining this chain of inequalities, we finally have p31,c ≥ 1/2.
• (S2,38) simplifies to p38,a + p38,c ≤ 1/2, i.e., p38,b + p38,d ≥ 1/2. Using this and p31,c ≥ 1/2, the
condition (S31,38) simplifies to p38,b +p38,d = p31,b +p31,d . This means that p31,b +p31,d ≥ 1/2,
and since p31,c ≥ 1/2, we can conclude p31,b + p31,d = p31,c = 1/2 and p31,a = 0.
It is now easy to see that each of the three cases in (S45,31) is a contradiction. We have thus shown
that the conditions are inconsistent, and therefore, there is no anonymous and neutral SDS for
four agents and alternatives that satisfies both strategyproofness and efficiency. 
A.2 Strategyproofness Conditions
Table 4 lists the strategyproofness conditions that were used in the impossibility proof. As ex-
plained in Section 4.3, all manipulations are either 1-manipulations or 2-manipulations, i.e., a ma-
nipulator breaks or introduces a tie between two alternatives or swaps two alternatives. They are
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a subset of the conditions derived by the derive_strategyproofness_conditions command with a dis-
tance threshold of 2, i.e., the required manipulations all have a size ≤ 2. The first number in the
name of the condition indicates the original profile and the second one is the manipulated profile
(possibly with a permutation applied to the alternatives).
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p2,d + p2,c ≤ p1,d + p1,c (S1,2)
p19,a < p1,a ∨ p19,a + p19,b < p1,a + p1,b ∨ (p19,a = p1,a ∧ p19,a + p19,b = p1,a + p1,b) (S1,19)
p1,d + p1,c < p2,d + p2,c ∨ p1,d + p1,c + p1,a < p2,d + p2,c + p2,a
∨ (p1,d + p1,c = p2,d + p2,c ∧ p1,d + p1,c + p1,a = p2,d + p2,c + p2,a)
(S2,1)
p38,c + p38,a ≤ p2,c + p2,a (S2,38)
p8,c < p4,d ∨ p8,c + p8,d < p4,d + p4,c ∨ (p8,c = p4,d ∧ p8,c + p8,d = p4,d + p4,c) (S4,8)
p18,c < p4,c ∨ p18,c + p18,b + p18,a < p4,c + p4,b + p4,a
∨ (p18,c = p4,c ∧ p18,c + p18,b + p18,a = p4,c + p4,b + p4,a)
(S4,18)
p47,d + p47,a ≤ p4,d + p4,a (S4,47)
p7,c + p7,a < p5,c + p5,a ∨ p7,c + p7,a + p7,d < p5,c + p5,a + p5,d
∨ (p7,c + p7,a = p5,c + p5,a ∧ p7,c + p7,a + p7,d = p5,c + p5,a + p5,d )
(S5,7)
p10,a < p5,d ∨ p10,a + p10,c + p10,d < p5,d + p5,b + p5,a
∨ (p10,a = p5,d ∧ p10,a + p10,c + p10,d = p5,d + p5,b + p5,a)
(S5,10)
p17,c + p17,a < p5,c + p5,a ∨ p17,c + p17,a + p17,d < p5,c + p5,a + p5,d
∨ (p17,c + p17,a = p5,c + p5,a ∧ p17,c + p17,a + p17,d = p5,c + p5,a + p5,d )
(S5,17)
p19,d < p6,d ∨ p19,d + p19,b < p6,d + p6,b ∨ p19,d + p19,b + p19,a < p6,d + p6,b + p6,a
∨ (p19,d = p6,d ∧ p19,d + p19,b = p6,d + p6,b ∧ p19,d + p19,b + p19,a = p6,d + p6,b + p6,a)
(S6,19)
p42,c + p42,a ≤ p6,c + p6,a (S6,42)
p43,d < p7,a ∨ p43,d + p43,b < p7,a + p7,c ∨ p43,d + p43,b + p43,a < p7,a + p7,c + p7,d
∨ (p43,d = p7,a ∧ p43,d + p43,b = p7,a + p7,c ∧ p43,d + p43,b + p43,a = p7,a + p7,c + p7,d )
(S7,43)
p26,a < p8,d ∨ p26,a + p26,b + p26,d < p8,d + p8,b + p8,a
∨ (p26,a = p8,d ∧ p26,a + p26,b + p26,d = p8,d + p8,b + p8,a)
(S8,26)
p18,d + p18,a < p9,d + p9,a ∨ p18,d + p18,a + p18,c < p9,d + p9,a + p9,c
∨ (p18,d + p18,a = p9,d + p9,a ∧ p18,d + p18,a + p18,c = p9,d + p9,a + p9,c )
(S9,18)
p35,b + p35,a ≤ p9,b + p9,a (S9,35)
p40,b + p40,a ≤ p9,b + p9,a (S9,40)
p12,b + p12,d < p10,c + p10,a ∨ p12,b + p12,d + p12,a < p10,c + p10,a + p10,d
∨ (p12,b + p12,d = p10,c + p10,a ∧ p12,b + p12,d + p12,a = p10,c + p10,a + p10,d )
(S10,12)
p15,a + p15,c < p10,d + p10,b ∨ p15,a + p15,c + p15,d < p10,d + p10,b + p10,a
∨ (p15,a + p15,c = p10,d + p10,b ∧ p15,a + p15,c + p15,d = p10,d + p10,b + p10,a)
(S10,15)
p19,a + p19,c < p10,d + p10,b ∨ p19,a + p19,c + p19,d < p10,d + p10,b + p10,a
∨ (p19,a + p19,c = p10,d + p10,b ∧ p19,a + p19,c + p19,d = p10,d + p10,b + p10,a)
(S10,19)
p36,a + p36,b ≤ p10,d + p10,c (S10,36)
p10,a + p10,c + p10,d ≤ p12,d + p12,b + p12,a (S12,10)
p16,c + p16,a < p12,c + p12,a ∨ p16,c + p16,a + p16,d < p12,c + p12,a + p12,d
∨ (p16,c + p16,a = p12,c + p12,a ∧ p16,c + p16,a + p16,d = p12,c + p12,a + p12,d )
(S12,16)
p44,b + p44,a ≤ p12,b + p12,a (S12,44)
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p15,d + p15,c < p13,d + p13,b ∨ p15,d + p15,c + p15,a < p13,d + p13,b + p13,a
∨ (p15,d + p15,c = p13,d + p13,b ∧ p15,d + p15,c + p15,a = p13,d + p13,b + p13,a)
(S13,15)
p27,a < p13,a ∨ p27,a + p27,c < p13,a + p13,b ∨ p27,a + p27,c + p27,d < p13,a + p13,b + p13,d
∨ (p27,a = p13,a ∧ p27,a + p27,c = p13,a + p13,b ∧
p27,a + p27,c + p27,d = p13,a + p13,b + p13,d )
(S13,27)
p9,a < p14,a ∨ p9,a + p9,d < p14,a + p14,d ∨ p9,a + p9,d + p9,c < p14,a + p14,d + p14,c
∨ (p9,a = p14,a ∧ p9,a + p9,d = p14,a + p14,d ∧ p9,a + p9,d + p9,c = p14,a + p14,d + p14,c )
(S14,9)
p16,c < p14,d ∨ p16,c + p16,d < p14,d + p14,c ∨
(p16,c = p14,d ∧ p16,c + p16,d = p14,d + p14,c )
(S14,16)
p34,d + p34,b + p34,a ≤ p14,c + p14,b + p14,a (S14,34)
p5,d < p15,a ∨ p5,d + p5,b < p15,a + p15,c ∨ p5,d + p5,b + p5,a < p15,a + p15,c + p15,d
∨ (p5,d = p15,a ∧ p5,d + p5,b = p15,a + p15,c ∧ p5,d + p5,b + p5,a = p15,a + p15,c + p15,d )
(S15,5)
p7,d + p7,b < p15,d + p15,b ∨ p7,d + p7,b + p7,a < p15,d + p15,b + p15,a
∨ (p7,d + p7,b = p15,d + p15,b ∧ p7,d + p7,b + p7,a = p15,d + p15,b + p15,a)
(S15,7)
p10,d < p15,a ∨ p10,d + p10,b < p15,a + p15,c ∨ p10,d + p10,b + p10,a < p15,a + p15,c + p15,d
∨ (p10,d = p15,a ∧ p10,d + p10,b = p15,a + p15,c ∧
p10,d + p10,b + p10,a = p15,a + p15,c + p15,d )
(S15,10)
p13,d + p13,b ≤ p15,d + p15,c (S15,13)
p3,c + p3,a ≤ p17,c + p17,a (S17,3)
p5,c + p5,a ≤ p17,c + p17,a (S17,5)
p7,c + p7,a ≤ p17,c + p17,a (S17,7)
p11,c + p11,a ≤ p17,c + p17,a (S17,11)
p9,d + p9,a ≤ p18,d + p18,a (S18,9)
p1,b + p1,a ≤ p19,b + p19,a (S19,1)
p10,b + p10,d ≤ p19,c + p19,a (S19,10)
p27,d + p27,b ≤ p19,d + p19,c (S19,27)
p21,c < p20,a ∨ p21,c + p21,b < p20,a + p20,c
∨ (p21,c = p20,a ∧ p21,c + p21,b = p20,a + p20,c )
(S20,21)
p35,c < p21,c ∨ p35,c + p35,b + p35,a < p21,c + p21,b + p21,a
∨ (p35,c = p21,c ∧ p35,c + p35,b + p35,a = p21,c + p21,b + p21,a)
(S21,35)
p29,a < p22,d ∨ p29,a + p29,c + p29,d < p22,d + p22,b + p22,a
∨ (p29,a = p22,d ∧ p29,a + p29,c + p29,d = p22,d + p22,b + p22,a)
(S22,29)
p32,a < p22,a ∨ p32,a + p32,b < p22,a + p22,b
∨ (p32,a = p22,a ∧ p32,a + p32,b = p22,a + p22,b)
(S22,32)
p12,c + p12,a ≤ p23,c + p23,a (S23,12)
p18,c + p18,d ≤ p23,d + p23,c (S23,18)
p19,d + p19,b + p19,a ≤ p23,d + p23,b + p23,a (S23,19)
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p34,b < p24,c ∨ p34,b + p34,d < p24,c + p24,a
∨ (p34,b = p24,c ∧ p34,b + p34,d = p24,c + p24,a)
(S24,34)
p26,d + p26,c < p25,d + p25,b ∨ p26,d + p26,c + p26,a < p25,d + p25,b + p25,a
∨ (p26,d + p26,c = p25,d + p25,b ∧ p26,d + p26,c + p26,a = p25,d + p25,b + p25,a)
(S25,26)
p36,a < p25,a ∨ p36,a + p36,c < p25,a + p25,c
∨ (p36,a = p25,a ∧ p36,a + p36,c = p25,a + p25,c )
(S25,36)
p8,d < p26,a ∨ p8,d + p8,b < p26,a + p26,c
∨ (p8,d = p26,a ∧ p8,d + p8,b = p26,a + p26,c )
(S26,8)
p13,b + p13,a ≤ p27,c + p27,a (S27,13)
p19,d + p19,c < p27,d + p27,b ∨ p19,d + p19,c + p19,a < p27,d + p27,b + p27,a
∨ (p19,d + p19,c = p27,d + p27,b ∧ p19,d + p19,c + p19,a = p27,d + p27,b + p27,a)
(S27,19)
p32,d < p28,a ∨ p32,d + p32,b < p28,a + p28,c
∨ (p32,d = p28,a ∧ p32,d + p32,b = p28,a + p28,c )
(S28,32)
p39,a < p28,a ∨ p39,a + p39,c < p28,a + p28,b
∨ (p39,a = p28,a ∧ p39,a + p39,c = p28,a + p28,b )
(S28,39)
p39,d < p29,a ∨ p39,d + p39,c < p29,a + p29,b
∨ (p39,d = p29,a ∧ p39,d + p39,c = p29,a + p29,b )
(S29,39)
p21,b + p21,a < p30,b + p30,a ∨ p21,b + p21,a + p21,d < p30,b + p30,a + p30,d
∨ (p21,b + p21,a = p30,b + p30,a ∧ p21,b + p21,a + p21,d = p30,b + p30,a + p30,d )
(S30,21)
p41,c < p30,c ∨ p41,c + p41,b + p41,a < p30,c + p30,b + p30,a
∨ (p41,c = p30,c ∧ p41,c + p41,b + p41,a = p30,c + p30,b + p30,a)
(S30,41)
p38,b + p38,d < p31,d + p31,b ∨ p38,b + p38,d + p38,c < p31,d + p31,b + p31,a
∨ (p38,b + p38,d = p31,d + p31,b ∧ p38,b + p38,d + p38,c = p31,d + p31,b + p31,a)
(S31,38)
p22,b + p22,a < p32,b + p32,a ∨ p22,b + p22,a + p22,d < p32,b + p32,a + p32,d
∨ (p22,b + p22,a = p32,b + p32,a ∧ p22,b + p22,a + p22,d = p32,b + p32,a + p32,d )
(S32,22)
p28,a < p32,d ∨ p28,a + p28,c + p28,d < p32,d + p32,b + p32,a
∨ (p28,a = p32,d ∧ p28,a + p28,c + p28,d = p32,d + p32,b + p32,a)
(S32,28)
p5,a < p33,a ∨ p5,a + p5,b < p33,a + p33,b
∨ (p5,a = p33,a ∧ p5,a + p5,b = p33,a + p33,b )
(S33,5)
p22,d + p22,c ≤ p33,d + p33,c (S33,22)
p24,c < p34,b ∨ p24,c + p24,a + p24,d < p34,b + p34,d + p34,a
∨ (p24,c = p34,b ∧ p24,c + p24,a + p24,d = p34,b + p34,d + p34,a)
(S34,24)
p9,a < p35,a ∨ p9,a + p9,b < p35,a + p35,b
∨ (p9,a = p35,a ∧ p9,a + p9,b = p35,a + p35,b )
(S35,9)
p21,c + p21,b + p21,a ≤ p35,c + p35,b + p35,a (S35,21)
p10,d < p36,a ∨ p10,d + p10,c < p36,a + p36,b
∨ (p10,d = p36,a ∧ p10,d + p10,c = p36,a + p36,b )
(S36,10)
p25,c + p25,a < p36,c + p36,a ∨ p25,c + p25,a + p25,d < p36,c + p36,a + p36,d
∨ (p25,c + p25,a = p36,c + p36,a ∧ p25,c + p25,a + p25,d = p36,c + p36,a + p36,d )
(S36,25)
p39,d + p39,c ≤ p36,d + p36,c (S36,39)
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p42,d < p37,a ∨ p42,d + p42,b < p37,a + p37,b
∨ (p42,d = p37,a ∧ p42,d + p42,b = p37,a + p37,b)
(S37,42 (1))
p42,d < p37,c ∨ p42,d + p42,b < p37,c + p37,d
∨ (p42,d = p37,c ∧ p42,d + p42,b = p37,c + p37,d )
(S37,42 (2))
p2,c + p2,a < p39,c + p39,a ∨ p2,c + p2,a + p2,d < p39,c + p39,a + p39,d
∨ (p2,c + p2,a = p39,c + p39,a ∧ p2,c + p2,a + p2,d = p39,c + p39,a + p39,d )
(S39,2)
p29,a + p29,b < p39,d + p39,c ∨ p29,a + p29,b + p29,d < p39,d + p39,c + p39,a
∨ (p29,a + p29,b = p39,d + p39,c ∧ p29,a + p29,b + p29,d = p39,d + p39,c + p39,a)
(S39,29)
p36,d + p36,c < p39,d + p39,c ∨ p36,d + p36,c + p36,a < p39,d + p39,c + p39,a
∨ (p36,d + p36,c = p39,d + p39,c ∧ p36,d + p36,c + p36,a = p39,d + p39,c + p39,a)
(S39,36)
p31,d + p31,b + p31,a ≤ p41,c + p41,b + p41,a (S41,31)
p3,d < p42,d ∨ p3,d + p3,b < p42,d + p42,b ∨ p3,d + p3,b + p3,a < p42,d + p42,b + p42,a
∨ (p3,d = p42,d ∧ p3,d + p3,b = p42,d + p42,b ∧ p3,d + p3,b + p3,a = p42,d + p42,b + p42,a)
(S42,3)
p11,d < p42,c ∨ p11,d + p11,b < p42,c + p42,a
∨ (p11,d = p42,c ∧ p11,d + p11,b = p42,c + p42,a)
(S42,11)
p24,b + p24,a ≤ p42,b + p42,a (S42,24)
p12,b + p12,a < p44,b + p44,a ∨ p12,b + p12,a + p12,d < p44,b + p44,a + p44,d
∨ (p12,b + p12,a = p44,b + p44,a ∧ p12,b + p12,a + p12,d = p44,b + p44,a + p44,d )
(S44,12)
p40,c + p40,d ≤ p44,d + p44,c (S44,40)
p31,c + p31,d < p45,b + p45,a ∨ p31,c + p31,d + p31,b < p45,b + p45,a + p45,c
∨ (p31,c + p31,d = p45,b + p45,a ∧ p31,c + p31,d + p31,b = p45,b + p45,a + p45,c)
(S45,31)
p20,c + p20,a ≤ p46,c + p46,a (S46,20)
p37,a + p37,c < p46,d + p46,b ∨ p37,a + p37,c + p37,d < p46,d + p46,b + p46,a
∨ (p37,a + p37,c = p46,d + p46,b ∧ p37,a + p37,c + p37,d = p46,d + p46,b + p46,a)
(S46,37)
p30,b + p30,a ≤ p47,b + p47,a (S47,30)
Table 4. The strategyproofness conditions used in the impossibility proof.
Table 5 lists the manipulations that were used to obtain these strategyproofness conditions: the
first column gives the name of the manipulation condition in the form (Si, j ), which also contains
the information which two profiles are involved in the manipulation (Ri and Rj ). The next columns
contain the manipulating agent, his preferences, and the false preferences that he needs to submit.
The last column gives the permutation of the alternatives that yields Rj when applied to the ma-
nipulated instance of Ri .
Condition Agent Old Preferences New Preferences Permutation
(S1,2) 1 {c,d}, {a,b} {c,d},a,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S1,19) 3 a,b, {c,d} {a,b}, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S2,1) 2 {c,d},a,b {c,d}, {a,b} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S2,38) 1 {a, c}, {b,d} {a, c},b,d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S4,8) 4 d, c, {a,b} c,d, {a,b} (a)(b)(c d)
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(S4,18) 3 c, {a,b},d {a,b, c},d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S4,47) 2 {a,d}, {b, c} {a,d}, c,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S5,7) 3 {a, c},d,b a, c,d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S5,10) 4 d, {a,b}, c {b,d},a, c (a d)(b c)
(S5,17) 3 {a, c},d,b {a, c}, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S6,19) 4 d,b,a, c {b,d},a, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S6,42) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} c,a, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S7,43) 3 a, c,d,b a, {c,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S8,26) 3 d, {a,b}, c d,b, {a, c} (a d)(b c)
(S9,18) 2 {a,d}, c,b {a,d}, {b, c} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S9,35) 1 {a,b}, {c,d} a,b, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S9,40) 1 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,b}, c,d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S10,12) 3 {a, c},d,b {a, c,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S10,15) 4 {b,d},a, c d,b,a, c (a d)(b c)
(S10,19) 4 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, {a, c} (a d)(b c)
(S10,36) 2 {c,d}, {a,b} d, c, {a,b} (a d)(b c)
(S12,10) 4 {a,b,d}, c {b,d},a, c (a d)(b c)
(S12,16) 3 {a, c},d,b a, c,d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S12,44) 2 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,b},d, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S13,15) 3 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, {a, c} (a)(b c)(d)
(S13,27) 4 a,b,d, c {a,b}, {c,d} (a)(b c)(d)
(S14,9) 4 a,d, c,b {a,d}, c,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S14,16) 2 d, c, {a,b} {c,d}, {a,b} (a)(b)(c d)
(S14,34) 3 {a,b, c},d b, {a, c},d (a)(b)(c d)
(S15,5) 4 a, c,d,b a, {c,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S15,7) 3 {b,d},a, c d, {a,b}, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S15,10) 4 a, c,d,b {a, c},d,b (a d)(b c)
(S15,13) 2 {c,d}, {a,b} {c,d},a,b (a)(b c)(d)
(S17,3) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} c,a, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S17,5) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} {a, c},d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S17,7) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} a, c,d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S17,11) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} c,a,b,d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S18,9) 2 {a,d}, {b, c} {a,d}, c,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S19,1) 1 {a,b}, {c,d} a,b, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S19,10) 4 {a, c}, {b,d} {a, c},d,b (a d)(b c)
(S19,27) 2 {c,d}, {a,b} {c,d},a,b (a)(b c)(d)
(S20,21) 3 a, c, {b,d} a, {c,d},b (a c b d)
(S21,35) 3 c, {a,b},d {a,b, c},d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S22,29) 3 d, {a,b}, c {b,d},a, c (a d)(b c)
(S22,32) 4 a,b, {c,d} {a,b},d, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S23,12) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} {a, c},d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S23,18) 2 {c,d}, {a,b} c,d, {a,b} (a)(b)(c d)
(S23,19) 4 {a,b,d}, c {b,d},a, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S24,34) 3 c,a, {b,d} c, {a,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S25,26) 2 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, {a, c} (a)(b c)(d)
(S25,36) 4 a, c, {b,d} {a, c},d,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S26,8) 4 a, c, {b,d} a, {c,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S27,13) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} a, c,d,b (a)(b c)(d)
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(S27,19) 2 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, {a, c} (a)(b c)(d)
(S28,32) 4 a, c, {b,d} a, {c,d},b (a d)(b c)
(S28,39) 3 a,b, {c,d} {a,b},d, c (a)(b c)(d)
(S29,39) 3 a,b, {c,d} {a,b},d, c (a d)(b c)
(S30,21) 4 {a,b},d, c a,b, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S30,41) 3 c, {a,b},d {a,b, c},d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S31,38) 1 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, c,a (a c)(b d)
(S32,22) 4 {a,b},d, c a,b, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S32,28) 3 d, {a,b}, c d,b, {a, c} (a d)(b c)
(S33,5) 3 a,b, {c,d} {a,b}, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S33,22) 1 {c,d}, {a,b} d, c, {a,b} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S34,24) 3 b, {a,d}, c b,d, {a, c} (a d)(b c)
(S35,9) 2 a,b, {c,d} {a,b}, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S35,21) 3 {a,b, c},d c, {a,b},d (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S36,10) 4 a,b, {c,d} {a,b}, {c,d} (a d)(b c)
(S36,25) 2 {a, c},d,b a, c, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S36,39) 1 {c,d}, {a,b} {c,d},a,b (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S37,42 (1)) 3 a,b, {c,d} a,b,d, c (a d)(b)(c)
(S37,42 (2)) 4 c,d, {a,b} c,d,b,a (a c d b)
(S39,2) 1 {a, c},d,b {a, c}, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S39,29) 4 {c,d},a,b d, c, {a,b} (a d)(b c)
(S39,36) 4 {c,d},a,b {c,d}, {a,b} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S41,31) 3 {a,b, c},d {b, c},a,d (a)(b)(c d)
(S42,3) 3 d,b,a, c d, {a,b}, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S42,11) 4 c,a, {b,d} c, {a,b},d (a b)(c d)
(S42,24) 2 {a,b}, {c,d} b,a, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S44,12) 3 {a,b},d, c {a,b}, {c,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S44,40) 1 {c,d}, {a,b} c,d, {a,b} (a)(b)(c d)
(S45,31) 3 {a,b}, c,d b,a, {c,d} (a d)(b c)
(S46,20) 3 {a, c}, {b,d} a, c, {b,d} (a)(b)(c)(d)
(S46,37) 1 {b,d},a, c {b,d}, {a, c} (a d)(b c)
(S47,30) 1 {a,b}, {c,d} {a,b},d, c (a)(b)(c)(d)
Table 5. The manipulations required to obtain the strategyproofness conditions in Table 4.
